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Smooth Fictitious Play in N × 2 Potential Games
Brian Swenson and H. Vincent Poor
Abstract—The paper shows that smooth fictitious play con-
verges to a neighborhood of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
with probability 1 in almost all N × 2 (N -player, two-action)
potential games. The neighborhood of convergence may be made
arbitrarily small by taking the smoothing parameter to zero.
Simple proof techniques are furnished by considering regular
potential games.
Index Terms—Game theory, potential games, smooth fictitious
play, online learning, pure Nash equilibria
I. INTRODUCTION
Potential games, originally introduced in [1], have
widespread application across economics, engineering, and
computer science [2]–[4]. In a potential game, there exists a
potential function which all players implicity wish to optimize.
The existence of a potential function has many benefits, not
least of which is that it guarantees the existence of pure Nash
equilibria (NE). Pure NE are deterministic, stable, and maxi-
mize the potential function (locally). Consequently, in game-
theoretic learning applications (particularly in those related to
decentralized control), pure NE are typically vastly preferable
to their mixed counterparts.
Another important benefit of potential games is that they are
amenable to game-theoretic learning processes. The potential
function serves as a Lyapunov function that ensures that vir-
tually any reasonable learning algorithm will converge to the
set of NE. However, many game-theoretic learning algorithms
operate by evolving in the space of mixed strategies, and for
these algorithms it is generally not clear if or when the limit
point of an algorithm will be a pure vs mixed NE.
Common examples of algorithms relying on mixed-strategy
adaptation include the exponential weights algorithm [5],
[6], regret matching [7], actor-critic algorithms [8], gradient-
descent based algorithms [9], fictitious-play based algorithms
[9]–[17], or, in continuous-time, Brown-von Neumann-Nash
dynamics [18], replicator dynamics [18] and best-response
dynamics [19]–[21]. In such algorithms, convergence to mixed
NE in potential games can be highly problematic.
In practice, there is a general understanding among prac-
titioners that most reasonable learning dynamics ought to
converge to pure NE in potential games [22]. However, a
rigorous understanding of this issue, in general, is lacking.
In this paper we address this deficiency for the special case
of smooth fictitious play (smooth FP) [23]–[26] in N × 2
potential games. Fictitious play (FP), introduced in [27], is
a canonical algorithm for learning in games. Smooth FP is a
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stochastic variant of FP that has been shown to achieve no-
regret learning and is useful for multi-agent online learning
[24], [28]. In potential games, smooth FP is known to converge
to a neighborhood of the set of NE [29]. However, the issue of
showing generic convergence to pure NE (or a neighborhood
thereof) has not yet been resolved.
As the main result of this paper, we show that in almost
all N × 2 potential games, smooth FP converges to the
neighborhood of a pure-strategy NE with probability 1. (See
Theorem 13 for our main result and Section IV for a definition
of “almost all potential games”)
We are able to obtain a simple proof of this result by
considering the notion of a regular potential game [30] (see
also [31], [32]). In a regular game, all equilibria are “nonde-
generate” in an appropriate sense that makes them well suited
for game-theoretic learning applications (see Section IV for
more details). This allows for a simple proof of our main
result within the class of regular potential games.
The recent work [30] showed that almost all potential games
are regular (see also Section IV below). Thus, using [30], the
results we derive here for smooth FP in regular potential games
immediately extend to almost all potential games. This is the
key idea of our approach.
We remark that regular potential games were used to study
continuous-time best-response (CT-BR) dynamics in [20]. CT-
BR dynamics may be viewed as the continuous-time version
of standard fictitious play. In [20] it was shown that CT-
BR dynamics converge to pure NE from almost all initial
conditions in almost all potential games. Our work here shows
an analogous result for smooth FP; however, the proof strategy
is much simpler in this case due to the smoothness of the
underlying dynamical system.
We also remark that, while we focus on games, the al-
gorithms we consider fall under the general umbrella of
dynamical systems for optimizing discrete problems, e.g., [10],
[33], [34], and are applicable in this domain, for example, as
parallel processing algorithms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II sets up notation. Section III introduces smooth FP. Section
IV introduces regular potential games and the notion of
“almost all games” in this context. Section V elucidates the
relationship between the limit points of smooth FP and the set
of NE and presents our main result (see Theorem 13). Section
VI concludes the paper.
II. NOTATION
A normal form game is given by the tuple Γ =
(N, (Ai, ui)
N
i=1), where N is the number of players, Ai =
{a1i , . . . , a
Ki
i } is the action set of player i (assumed to be
finite) and ui : A1 × · · · × AN → R is the utility function of
player i. Given i ∈ {1, . . . , N} we let A−i =
∏
j 6=iAj .
2The main results of this paper will focus on N × 2 games;
i.e., games with N players and two actions per player. Unless
otherwise stated, we will assume through the remainder of the
paper that we are dealing only with N × 2 games.1
A game is said to be a potential game, as introduced in
[1], if there exists a function u : A1 × · · · × AN → R such
that u(ai, a−i)−u(a
′
i, a−i) = ui(ai, a−i)−ui(a
′
i, a−i) for all
ai, a
′
i ∈ Ai, and a−i ∈ A−i. In this paper we will focus on
games with identical interests, i.e., games where ui = u for all
i, as these games are strategically equivalent to potential games
and the dynamical systems considered in this paper behave
identically on a potential game or an associated identical-
interests game.
To properly define smooth fictitious play we must consider
the set of mixed strategies where players mix probabilistically
between actions. Let ∆i denote the set of probability distri-
butions over the action set Ai. Since we assume that Γ is
an N × 2 game, in an abuse of notation we will represent a
strategy xi ∈ ∆i as single real number xi ∈ [0, 1], which is
interpreted as the probability mass placed on the action a1i . The
set of joint mixed strategies is given by ∆ := ∆1×· · ·×∆N ,
which may be viewed as the hypercube ∆ = [0, 1]N .
Given a mixed strategy x ∈ ∆, we define
U(x) :=
∑
i=1,...,N
ki=1,2
zk11 (x1) · · · z
kN
N (xN )u(a
k1
1 , . . . , a
kN
N )
where z1i (xi) = xi represents the probability of player i play-
ing action a1i and z
2
i = (1−xi) represents the complementary
probability. We emphasize that U(x) is simply the expected
value of the potential given the mixed strategy x ∈ ∆. In
an abuse of notation, we will use U(aki , x−i) to represent the
expected potential of action aki ∈ Ai under the mixed strategy
x−i ∈
∏
j 6=i∆j .
The set of Nash equilibria is given by
NE := {x ∈ ∆ : U(xi, x−i) ≥ U(x
′
i, x−i) for all x
′
i ∈ ∆}
Smooth fictitious is defined using the notion of a smoothed
best response. Formally, the smoothed (or logit) best response
is given by
B̂Rλi (x) :=
exp( 1
λ
U(a1i , x−i))∑
k=1,2 exp(
1
λ
U(aki , x−i))
, (1)
for smoothing parameter λ > 0.
We remark that, since we focus on N × 2 games, we have
simplified our notation. In general, B̂Rλi (x) is an element of
∆i specifying the weight placed on each action in Ai. Since
we treat ∆i to be [0, 1] here, B̂R
λ
i (x) should be interpreted as
the weight placed on a1i . The weight placed on a
2
i is simply
obtained as 1− B̂Rλi (x).
Note that as λ→ 0 the perturbed best response approaches
a probability distribution uniformly distributing its mass on
actions that maximize the potential function. Similarly, we
define the joint smoothed best response as
B̂Rλ(x) := B̂Rλ1 (x)× · · · × B̂R
λ
N (x).
1We note however, that with the exception of Proposition 12 and Theorem
13, all results are valid for games of arbitrary size.
We remark that for all x ∈ ∆, B̂Rλ(x) is unique and lies in
the interior of ∆.
Following [35] we refer to a fixed point of B̂Rλ as a Nash
distribution (with parameter λ), and denote the set of Nash
distributions by
ND(λ) := {x : x = B̂Rλ(x)}.
The set ND(λ), λ > 0 is not the same as the set of
NE. However, we will see that in regular potential games,
convergence of the set of Nash distributions to the set of NE
does occur as λ→ 0 (see Theorem 10 below).
Finally, as a matter of notation when we say that a function
is of class Ck, k ≥ 1 we mean that it is k times continuously
differentiable. Given a function F : Rd → Rd, we use the
notation DF (x) to denote the Jacobian of F at x. Given a
set of scalars a1, . . . , ak, we let diag (a1, . . . , ak) denote the
k × k matrix with entries a1, . . . , ak on the diagonal.
III. SMOOTH FP
A. Smooth fictitious Play
Suppose players repeatedly play some fixed game Γ. For
n ≥ 0, let ai(n) denote the action taken by player i in round n,
and let xi(n) =
1
n
∑n
s=1 1{ai(s)=a1i}
represent the empirical
distribution of player i, where 1{ai(s)=a1i} = 1 if ai(s) = a
1
i
and 1{ai(s)=a1i} = 0 otherwise.
Smooth fictitious play is defined as follows. Let the initial
action ai(0) be chosen arbitrarily. For n ≥ 0, players choose
their next-stage action according to the probabilistic rule
P(ai(n+ 1) = a
k
i ) =
exp( 1
λ
U(aki , x−i(n)))∑2
m=1 exp(
1
λ
U(aki , x−i(n)))
, (2)
or equivalently, P(ai(n+1) = a
1
i ) = B̂R
λ
i (x(n)) and P(ai(n+
1) = a2i ) = 1 − B̂R
λ
i (x(n)). The empirical distribution is
updated as
xi(n+ 1) = xi(n) +
1
n+ 1
(ai(n+ 1)− xi(n)) . (3)
We refer to the update procedure (2)–(3) as smooth FP.2
Smooth FP is known to converge to the set ND(λ) in several
classes of games including potential games [29].
B. Smoothed Best-Response Dynamics
The long run behavior of the state in smooth FP (considered
to be the empirical distribution (3)) is determined by the ODE
x˙(t) = B̂Rλ(x(t)) − x(t), (4)
where x : [0,∞)→ RN .
Remark 1. We remark that, in contrast to B̂Rλ, the standard
best response (which is approximated by B̂Rλ as λ → 0) is
set valued and discontinuous. The properties of genuine best
response dynamics in potential games are studied in [20].
The following definition, standard from dynamical systems
theory, will be central to our treatment.
2More general notions of smooth FP are considered in [24].
3Definition 2 (Hyperbolic rest point). Consider a differential
equation
x˙ = F (x) (5)
where F : Rn → Rn is C1. A rest point x of (5) is said to be
hyperbolic if the Jacobian DF (x) is nonsingular.
We will see that smooth FP will only converge to Nash
distributions that are stable under (4), as defined below.
Definition 3 (Linearly stable point). We say that a rest point of
(5) is linearly stable if all eigenvalues of DF (x) have negative
real part.
The following theorem from [29] characterizes the limit
points of (2)–(3) in terms of the rest points of (4).
Theorem 4. If all rest points of (4) are hyperbolic, then with
probability 1, the set of limit points of (2)–(3) is the set of
linearly stable Nash distributions.
IV. REGULAR POTENTIAL GAMES
The notion of a regular game was first introduced by
Harsanyi in [31]. The main advantage of regular games is
that their equilibria are robust, nondegenerate,3 and easy to
analyze [32].
Let x∗ be an equilibrium of a potential game. Without loss
of generality, assume that the pure strategy set is ordered so
that x∗i > 0 for all i.
An equilibrium of a potential game is regular if it satisfies
two properties. First, a regular equilibrium must be quasi-
strict as defined below (see also [32]).4 Second, at a regular
equilibrium, the Hessian of the potential function must be
“nondegenerate.”
We now define these properties formally.
Definition 5. An equilibrium x∗ is said to be quasi strict if
x∗i = 1 implies that y
2
i is not a pure-strategy best response to
x∗−i.
Before defining the notion of nondegeneracy for the Hes-
sian, note that an equilibrium x∗ may be on the boundary of
the strategy space. Informally, to characterize degeneracy, we
need to check the behavior of derivatives only in coordinates
where the constraints are not active.
To formalize this, let N˜ denote the number of mixing
players, i.e., N˜ = |{i ∈ {1, . . . , N} : x∗,1i 6= 1}|, and without
loss of generality, assume that the strategy set is ordered so
that x∗i < 1, i = 1, . . . , N˜ (i.e., players 1, . . . , N˜ used genuine
mixed strategies and the remaining players use pure strategies
at x∗). The restricted Hessian of U , relative to x∗, is given
by5
H(x) :=
(
∂U(x)
∂xi∂xj
)
i,j=1,...,N˜
(6)
3Nash equilibria may possess many “quirky” properties, including dis-
continuity with respect to payoffs, connected sets of NE, and others [32]. We
use the term “degenerate” imprecisely here to refer generally to such behavior.
See [32] for a detailed treatment.
4We remark that this definition has been adapted to suit N × 2 games.
5We note that, in this definition, we define H(·) with respect to some
NE x∗ but allow for H(·) to be evaluated at an arbitrary x ∈ ∆. This is so
we may evaluate H(·) at elements of ND(λ) that some NE.
The notion of a regular equilibrium is now defined below.
Definition 6. A Nash equilibrium x∗ of a potential game is
said to be regular if
(i) x∗ is quasi strict, and
(ii) The restricted Hessian H(x∗) is invertible.
Remark 7. We comment on the two extreme cases in the
definition of regularity. Note that if an equilibrium x∗ is in the
interior of the strategy space, then regularity simply reduces
to the condition that x∗ is a nondegenerate critical point of U
in the standard sense. On the other hand, if x∗ is at a vertex
of the strategy space, then regularity is equivalent to x∗ being
a strict equilibrium (i.e., u(a) > u(a′i, a−i) for all a
′
i ∈ Ai
and all i). In the intermediate case that x∗ lies on a boundary
of the simplex but is not a vertex, regularity may be seen as
a mixture of these two conditions.
We define the notion of a regular game as follows.
Definition 8. A potential game Γ is said to be regular if all
equilibria in the game are regular.
Regular games possess a multitude of desirable stability and
robustness properties. See [32] for an extensive treatment.
We would like to be able to say that “almost all” potential
games are regular. To this end, we will now define a suitable
notion of “almost all” in this context. Suppose that we are
given integers N and Ki, i = 1, . . . , N . Consider the set
of all N -player potential games having action spaces with
cardinality |Ai| = Ki. Observe that any such game is uniquely
defined by a payoff vector u ∈ RK1×···×KN .
We say that almost allN×2 potential games satisfy a certain
property if for any N , the set of all N × 2 potential games
for which the property fails to hold is a closed, measure-zero
subset of R2N .
The following theorem from [30] establishes that regularity
is in fact a generic property within the class of potential games.
Theorem 9 ( [30], Theorem 1). Almost all potential games
are regular.
V. NASH DISTRIBUTIONS IN
REGULAR POTENTIAL GAMES
A. Nash Distributions and Nash Equilibria
In regular potential games the set of NE is finite ([30],
Theorem 2). The following theorem establishes the close
relationship between the set of NE and the set ND(λ) in
regular potential games.
Theorem 10. Suppose Γ is a regular potential game. Then the
set of NE is finite. Moreover, for λ > 0 sufficiently small there
is a one-to-one correspondence between the set of NE and
ND(λ) with each element of ND(λ) converging continuously
to an associated Nash equilibrium point as λ→ 0.
We remark that, implicit in the above theorem is the fact
that ND(λ) is finite for λ sufficiently small (see also [29],
Theorem 4.3 and Theorem 12 below). A proof of this result
is omitted for brevity. However, the result follows readily by
observing that the smoothed best response B̂Rλi (x) is obtained
4by maximizing U(xi, x−i)+λ
∑n
i=1 xi log(xi). As λ→ 0, the
critical points of this perturbed function converge to the set of
NE in regular games.
By construction, all Nash distributions lie in the interior of
the strategy set. However, in an abuse of terminology, we will
use the following nomenclature.
Definition 11. We say that a Nash distribution is a pure-
strategy Nash distribution if it converges to a pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium as λ→ 0.
B. Hyperbolicity of Nash Distributions
Theorem 4 shows that in games with hyperbolic Nash
distributions, the limit points of smooth FP are, almost surely,
linearly stable Nash distributions. The following theorem
shows that in regular potential games, all Nash distributions
are hyperbolic and only pure-strategy Nash distributions are
linearly stable. Thus, together with Theorem 4 and Theorem
9, the following proposition will immediately imply the main
result of the paper (Theorem 13 below).
Proposition 12. If Γ is a regular N × 2 potential game, then
for all λ > 0 sufficiently small, all Nash distributions are
hyperbolic. Moreover, a Nash distribution is linearly stable if
and only if it is a pure-strategy Nash distribution.
Proof. Let
Fi(x) := B̂R
λ
i (x)− xi,
and let F (x) = (Fi(x))
N
i=1 represent the right hand side
of (4). Note that we may express U(x) as U(xi, x−i) =
xiU(a
1
i , x−i) + (1− xi)U(a
2
i , x−i). Hence,
∂U(x)
∂xi
= U(a1i , x−i)− U(a
2
i , x−i),
and
∂2U(x)
∂xi∂xj
=
∂U(a1i , x−i)
∂xj
−
∂U(a2i , x−i)
∂xj
. (7)
We now compute
∂B̂Rλ(x)
∂xj
. For j = i we have ∂B̂R
λ(x)
∂xj
=
0 = ∂
2U(x)
∂x2
i
. For j 6= i we have
B̂Rλi (x)
∂xj
=
1
λ
exp( 1
λ
U(aki , x−i))∑
k=1,2 exp(
1
λ
U(aki , x−i))
∂U(a1i , x−i)
∂xj
−
1
λ
exp( 1
λ
U(aki , x−i))(∑
k=1,2 exp(
1
λ
U(aki , x−i))
)2
×
(
exp(
1
λ
U(a1i , x−i))
∂U(a1i , x−i)
∂xj
+ exp(
1
λ
U(a2i , x−i))
∂U(a2i , x−i)
∂xj
)
Suppose henceforth that xλ ∈ ND(λ), so that xλ = B̂Rλ(xλ),
and that x∗ is the NE associated with xλ so that xλ → x∗ as
λ→ 0. From the above we see that
B̂Rλi (x
λ)
∂xj
=
1
λ
xλi
∂U(a1i , x
λ
−i)
∂xj
−
1
λ
xλi
(
xλi
∂U(a1i , x
λ
−i)
∂xj
+ (1− xλi )
∂U(a1i , x
λ
−i)
∂xj
)
=
1
λ
xλi (1− x
λ
i )
(
∂U(a1i , x
λ
−i)
∂xj
−
∂U(a2i , x
λ
−i)
∂xj
)
.
From (7) we see that
B̂Rλi (x
λ)
∂xj
=
1
λ
xλi (1− x
λ
i )
∂2U(xλ)
∂xi∂xj
Without loss of generality, assume that the set of players is
ordered so that players 1, . . . , N˜ play mixed strategies. Let Rλ
be the diagonal N˜ × N˜ matrix given by
Rλ := diag (x
λ
1 (1− x
λ
1 ), . . . , x
λ
N˜
(1− xλ
N˜
)).
Define the matrices
Bλ :=
(
xλi (1− x
λ
i )
∂2U(xλ)
∂xi∂xj
)
i=1,...,N˜
j=N˜+1,...,N
,
and
Cλ :=
(
xλi (1− x
λ
i )
∂2U(xλ)
∂xi∂xj
)
i,j=N˜+1,...,N
,
and observe that we have
DF (xλ) =
1
λ
(
RλH(x
λ) Bλ
BTλ Cλ
)
− IN ,
where IN is the N ×N identity matrix, and H(x
λ) (defined
w.r.t. x∗) is defined in (6).
Without loss of generality, assume that the pure strategy set
is ordered so that x∗i > 0 for all i. Since Γ is regular, x
∗
is a strict NE and there exists constants c1 and c2 such that
U(a1i , x−i) ≥ c1 > c2 ≥ U(a
2
i , x−i) for all x in a ball about
x∗. For i > N˜ , by our ordering of the pure strategy set we
have x∗i = 1, and, since x
λ
i = B̂R
λ
i (x
λ), using (1) we have
1
λ
(1−xλi )→ 0 and x
λ
i → 1 as λ→∞. Thus,
1
λ
Bλ and
1
λ
Cλ
converge entrywise to zero.
If x∗ is a pure NE, then we have DF (xλ) = 1
λ
Cλ−IN , and
taking λ > 0 sufficiently small, each eigenvalue of DF (xλ)
may be brought arbitrarily close to -1. Thus, for all λ > 0
sufficiently small, xλ is hyperbolic and stable under (4).
If x∗ is a mixed NE, then, since Γ is regular, H(x∗)
is invertible and has at least one positive eigenvalue. Since
H(xλ) → H(x∗) as λ → 0, taking λ → 0 we see that
DF (xλ) is invertible and has at least one positive eigenvalue
for all λ > 0 sufficiently small ([36], Theorem II.6.1). Thus,
for all λ > 0 sufficiently small, xλ is hyperbolic and unstable
under (4).
5C. Main Result
Finally, we state the main result of the paper.
Theorem 13. In almost all N×2 potential games, for all λ >
0 sufficiently small, smooth FP converges to a pure-strategy
Nash distribution with probability 1.
Theorem 13 follows immediately from Theorem 4, Theorem
9, and Proposition 12.
Remark 14. We remark that by Theorem 10, Theorem 13
implies that any limit point of smooth FP may be brought
arbitrarily close to the set of pure-strategy NE by taking λ
sufficiently small.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Game-theoretic learning dynamics are typically known to
converge to the set of NE in potential games. However, the
question of convergence to pure vs mixed strategies is often
unclear in algorithms that evolve in the mixed strategy space.
In this paper we have considered the case of smooth FP in N×
2 potential games and shown convergence to the neighborhood
of pure NE with probability 1. The key enabler of our result
and analysis technique was notion of a regular potential game
[30]. We hypothesize that analogous results may be obtained
for other learning algorithms in potential games by applying
similar techniques.
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